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Abstract
This paper examines the relation between competitive pressure and financial constraints
using firm-level survey data from 27 emerging economies of Eastern Europe and Central
Asia for the years 2005 and 2009. In the empirical analysis, we disentangle the impact of
product market competition on the demand and supply of credit. Our results support the
hypothesis that competitive pressure on borrowers affects both sides of the credit market. We
find that in industries with greater competitive pressure firms’ demand for credit is typically
higher but a greater proportion of firms are discouraged from loan application due to greater
cost of credit. Interestingly, we find the detrimental effect of competitive pressure on credit
access breaks down when firms are audited, they can pledge collateral and when they engage
in export activities. These results point to the role of competitive pressure into the lenders’
information set when limited information is available.
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1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) on asymmetric information, and that of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing, a large body of the financial literature has shown that
financial frictions can lead to credit market failures with distortions in the price mechanism.
In a frictionless economy, the flow of funds would move from the least profitable project to the
project with the highest net present value (NPV). In contrast, in the presence of asymmetric
information, factors become important to determine if a project is viable and whether the firm
would be able to obtain the necessary financing. As documented by Campello et al. (2011)
using a survey of CFOs in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, asymmetric information can impose
financial frictions even on creditworthy firms, forcing them to abandon valuable investment
opportunities and imposing deep spending cuts. In this context, factors like firm size, net-
worth and cash flow become of great importance. In addition, in the presence of information
asymmetries external funding is typically more expensive than internal funding.1 A very well
known result in the empirical literature in that asymmetric information is especially detrimental
for small and medium enterprises’ access to credit, as these firms generally have low cash-flow
and net-worth.(e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988)
The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to one question that has so far received little
attention in the literature: whether there exists a relationship between a firm’s ability to recruit
external funds and the competitiveness of the economic environment in which it operates. This
research question is particularly of interest in the context of emerging economies undergoing
a process of market liberalization, through the removal of barriers to foreign and domestic
competition. In an Arrow-Debreu settings with complete information, investors can perfectly
predict the profitability of firms in a newly liberalized market, and the financial system would
amplify the efficiency gains of the liberalization process. This is because the least efficient firms
1The seminal work of Myers and Majluf (1984) shows how adverse selection in the credit market may generate a
pecking order in a firms’ financing choice with retained earnings favored over debt and debt over equity financing.
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would have lower probability of survival and a more restricted access to credit. On the contrary,
in the presence of information asymmetries, the allocation of credit across firms might not reflect
their efficiency, but rather their ability to pledge collateralizable assets. Hence, in the presence
of information asymmetries, the financial market might not necessarily facilitate the allocation
of resources towards the most productive firm; hampering the expected efficiency gains of the
liberalization process.
The relationship between market structure and firms’ finance can be driven by the interplay of
both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, firms operating in a competitive industry
may have greater need for external funding to innovate and to escape Schumpeterian selection.
In addition, firms exposed to greater competition have generally lower markup and profits,
which may generate insufficient retained earnings to internally finance current expenses and
investment. On the supply side, lenders may attach a greater risk of default to firms that are more
exposed to domestic and foreign competition. More specifically, firms operating in industries
with fiercer competition have less pledgeable income and lower collateral.2 The hypothesis
that the competitive environment is a relevant factor for financial intermediaries’ decisions to
extend credit finds anecdotal support in the practices of the major rating agencies. An example
is provided by the following excerpt from Fitch Ratings China (2012): “Industries that are
in decline, highly competitive, capital intensive, cyclical or volatile are inherently riskier than
stable industries with few competitors, high barriers to entry, national rather than international
competition and predictable demand level”. The effects of competition on lenders’ behaviour
may be exacerbated in an environment where it is difficult or expensive to assess individual
firms’ prospects and where lenders rely more extensively on industry-level information such as
openness to new competitors or the rate of technological change.
Moving from these premises, our study examines the relation between competition and the
2In the presence of transaction costs and incomplete contracts the role of collateral has been highlighted by
the theoretical literature on contract theory (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
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credit market on a sample of firms operating in countries where incomplete protection of cred-
itors’ rights and the recent entry of foreign banks exacerbate information asymmetry. We con-
tribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, we provide evidence that a firm exposed
to greater competitive pressure is more likely to report serious financial constraints. Second,
we disentangle the differential impact of competitive pressure on a firm’s need for credit and on
the probability of getting a loan. Third, we examine the role of dissipative signals such as cer-
tification, collateral and export status in mitigating the effect of competitive pressure on firms’
access to credit.3 Our analysis is conducted on survey data from the Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), which covers 27,000 manufacturing and services
firms from 27 transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Countries covered by BEEPS offer the ideal environment to study the relation between com-
petition and financial constraints because the industrial transformation and the integration of
these economies in international trade have largely occurred in the presence of less advanced
financial systems and weaker institutions. Although foreign banks control a large proportion
of the banking sector, the extension of credit to small and medium enterprises has been gen-
erally held back by slower institutional reform in the protection of creditors’ rights and in the
creation of credit registries (EBRD, 2006). As a result, during the last decade these economies
have experienced substantial variations in the intensity of competitive pressure, while all pre-
sented insufficient access to credit, especially for SMEs. As suggested by Carlin et al. (2004), the
main advantage of studying transition economies is that their competitive environment has been
largely shaped by exogenous policies implemented during the early stages of the liberalization
process. Hence, these economies approximate the desirable features of a large scale natural ex-
periment, ideal to test the effects of competition on firm behavior. Since our study refers to later
stages of the transition process, the ‘natural experiment argument’ might have been somehow
weakened by the endogenous evolution of the competitive environment within industries, but
3The dissipative signal terminology is borrowed from Tirole (2006, p. 249)
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it is still reasonable to assume that financial factors did not play a major role in shaping the
competitive pressure at the industry level.
In addition, the inclusion of specific questions that allow us to distinguish between a firm’s
need and access to external financing makes BEEPS a unique resource to study financial con-
straints. These data have previously been used to investigate the relationship between access
to credit and information sharing. For instance, Brown et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2011)
study the role of inter-bank information sharing and firm access to finance, and Popov and Udell
(2012) study the sensitivity of credit supply to financial frictions arising from the institutional
environment in which banks operate. The previous work that is most closely related to our
study is Valta (2012). In that study the authors infers a causal relationship between product
market competition and cost of credit. Our paper is also tangential to the literature on how a
firm’s optimal financial structure is affected by industry-level factors. For instance Chava and
Jarrow (2004) and Huang and Lee (2013) Huang and Lee (2013) show that default and credit
risks are affected by industries’ characteristics.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents some
suggestive evidence of a relationship between competitive pressure and financial constraints.
Section 3 outlines a two-stage model to separate the role of credit demand and supply. Section
?? explores the hypothesis that the relationship between financial constraints and competitive
pressure is moderated by a firms’ ability to signal its creditworthiness. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and preliminary analysis
The analysis is conduced on data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys (BEEPS), which covers the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.4
BEEPS data were collected through face-to-face interviews with the executives of the sampled
firms. BEEPS include a rich set of information about firms’ characteristics such as origin,
ownership structure, number of employees, sales in the previous fiscal year, age and export
status that can be used to control for firm-level heterogeneity in cross-sectional models. The key
variables of interest are based on the survey questions concerning firms’ access to credit and the
need for external financing. The wording of these questions change across survey waves hence
we decide to use only the 2005 and 2009 waves of BEEPS to increase the comparability of these
information across waves.
Our dataset includes 19,136 observations from 27 countries, where the number of firms from
each country is proportional to the size of each economy.5 Table 1 breaks down the dataset by
survey wave, country, firm’s age and size. Small firms, with less than 20 employees constitute the
largest size group accounting for over the 45% of the sample, and 85% of the firms in the sample
have been operating for less than 20 years at the date of the interview. Hence, our sample over-
represents small and relatively younger companies that are more likely to face binding financial
constraints.
One of the variables that are both present in the 2005 and the 2009 waves of BEEPS mea-
sures the extent to which access to external financing is considered as an obstacles for a firm’s
current operations and future growth. We rename this categorical variable Access. It takes
values ranging from 1 to 4, where the lowest and the highest values respectively indicate the
4This survey is a joint initiative of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and of
the World Bank Group and it was implemented to assess the barriers encountered by firms. The first wave of
surveys was conducted in 1999/2000 and the fourth and last one in 2008/2009. The survey questionnaire changed
over time, and not all the variables are comparable across waves.
5The survey sample in BEEPS is stratified by country, industry and region to enhance its representativeness
across multiple dimensions.
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Table 1: Breakdown of sample by country, survey wave, firm age
and size
Survey wave Age Size
2005 2009 Young Mid-age Mature Small Medium Large
Albania 204 54 27 215 16 143 88 27
Armenia 351 374 114 513 98 408 219 98
Azerbaijan 350 380 58 528 144 323 271 136
Belarus 325 273 59 431 108 254 200 144
Bosnia 200 261 33 364 164 240 191 130
Bulgaria 300 288 21 473 94 318 163 107
Croatia 236 104 7 248 85 182 85 73
Czech Republic 343 250 47 497 49 307 156 130
Estonia 219 273 21 426 45 233 148 111
FYROM 200 366 49 403 114 264 191 111
Georgia 200 373 59 439 75 292 197 84
Hungary 610 291 58 739 104 428 286 187
Kazakhstan 585 544 159 897 73 433 419 277
Kyrgyz 202 235 23 322 92 183 167 87
Latvia 205 271 33 408 35 222 126 128
Lithuania 205 276 34 394 53 211 150 120
Moldova 350 363 70 592 51 292 261 160
Montenegro 18 116 8 110 15 71 43 19
Poland 975 533 69 1,062 377 821 369 240
Romania 600 541 63 973 105 439 387 315
Russia 601 1251 167 1,371 319 531 537 537
Serbia 282 388 55 421 195 300 178 193
Slovakia 220 275 45 402 48 224 143 127
Slovenia 223 76 13 341 145 240 129 130
Tajikistan 200 360 91 356 113 248 220 92
Ukraine 594 851 150 1,048 247 655 467 323
Uzbekistan 300 366 46 470 150 302 213 151
Total 9,098 10,038 1,579 14,443 3,114 8,564 6,004 4,237
Notes: The table reports the number of firms falling within different country-age, and
country-size cells. Young, Mid-age and Mature refer to firms that were created up to 5
years, between 5 and 20 years, and over 20 years before the survey date, respectively. Small,
Medium and Large refer respectively to firms with a number of permanent employees that
is less or equal to 20, greater than 20 but smaller than 100, and greater than 100.
least and most serious financial constraints.6 Despite the measurement error due to the subjec-
tive evaluation of the interviewees, this self-reported measure of financial constraints is useful to
identify firms that have difficult access to credit. BEEPS also includes a set of indicators that
capture different aspects of the competitive environment: CostDom and CostFor respectively
measure the importance of domestic and foreign competition on firms’ decisions to reduce pro-
duction costs. ProdDom and ProdFor gauge competitors’ influence on firms’ efforts to develop
new goods and services. These variables assume four possible values ranging from 1 to 4, where
4 corresponds to the highest level of competitive pressure on the firm.7
6Table A1 in the Appendix reports the wording of the relevant questions and the coding of the possible answers.
7Table A3 in the Appendix shows the distribution of firms with different legal status, size and age across
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Table 2: Explained variance of the main variables
Access CostDom CostFor ProdDom ProdFor
Country 0.039 0.061 0.070 0.058 0.063
Time 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000
Industry (ISIC 3-digit) 0.014 0.013 0.071 0.012 0.070
Country-Time 0.076 0.071 0.083 0.067 0.074
Industry-time 0.024 0.017 0.078 0.018 0.073
Notes: The table reports the adjusted R2s obtained by regressing each variable in
columns on different sets of dummy variables corresponding to the dimensions of the
database reported in rows.
Our dataset is multidimensional as it includes firms from different countries, industries and
surveyed in two different years. It is therefore necessary to understand which single dimension
explains most of the variations in the self-reported indicators of access to credit and competitive
pressure. Table 2 reports the adjusted R2 obtained by regressing the indicators of financial
access and competition on different sets of dummies capturing respectively country, time, in-
dustry and country-time fixed effects.8 The cross-country dimension explains individually the
greatest share of the variance in Access (3.9%), CostDom (6.1%), CostFor (7%), ProdDom
(5.8%) and ProdFor (6.3%). Country-time fixed effects have a significantly larger explanatory
power than country fixed effects as the R2s of the regressions including this set of dummies
are significantly larger. This evidence suggests that between 2005 and 2009 firms in different
countries experienced a different evolution of the competitive and the financial environment.
However, none of the dimensions reported in table 2 explains individually more than 8.5% of
the variance of the variables of interests, confirming that firm-level variations dwarf differences
across countries, time and industries. The limited importance of the cross-country dimension
suggests that country-level policies or macroeconomic factors may have had a very different
impact on access to finance and on the competitive pressure of individual firms. Instead, the
different categories of the variables Access, CostDom and CostFor. Over the whole sample, about 48% of firms
report that access to finance is a moderate (Access = 3) or a serious (Access == 4) obstacle to their current
operations and growth. In addition, over the 60% of firms identify domestic competition as a fairly important
(CostDom = 3) or very important (CostDom = 4) factor in inducing further reductions of the production costs.
In addition, competitive pressure on production costs appears to be relatively stronger on private, smaller and
younger enterprises. In contrast, foreign competition appears to be a less important factor in driving down
production costs with less than 50% of firms reporting this to be a fairly important (CostFor = 3) of very
important (CostDom = 4) factor.
8Industries are defined at the 3-digit level of ISIC aggregation.
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relatively small contribution of industry dummies may suggest that 3-digit ISIC industries are
not disaggregated enough to capture most of the technological aspects that affect financial con-
straints (e.g., dependence from external finance), or the fact that these aggregations imperfectly
identify groups of firms competing among each others. The predominant firm-level component
in the variation of these variables, confirms that firm-level measures of financial constraints
and competition capture more fine-grained aspects than are missed by adopting industry-level
measures.9
The self-reported indicators of domestic competition CostDom and ProdDom have a strong
pairwise correlation in the sample (0.71), and the same happens for the the indicators of foreign
competition CostFor and ProdFor (0.81). These strong correlations anticipates some difficulties
in identifying separately the effects of competitive pressure on costs and products in econometric
models. Therefore, these information are aggregated to create two indices of domestic and foreign
competition that will be used when high collinearity inflates the variance of the estimates:
CompDom = (CostDom+ ProdDom)− 28− 2
CompFor = (CostFor + ProdFor)− 28− 2
these indicators range from 0 and 1, where higher values indicate the ‘tougher’ competitive
environments, where firms need both to reduce costs and to innovate products to survive on the
market.
9The tradeoff implicit in the use of firm-level variables based on survey questions is that part of their variation
is due to the noise introduced by interviewees’ subjective evaluation, or to the effect of firm-level factors affecting
managers’ perception of financial constraints and competition. When using these indicators in regression analysis
it is therefore necessary to control for firm-level characteristics that are associated with higher probability to
report more or less intense competition and financial constraints.
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3 Empirical analysis
The objectives of this section is twofold; firstly we test whether firms operating in a tougher
competitive environment are more financially constraint; second we investigate whether this
relationship is driven by the demand or the supply of credit.
3.1 Competitive pressure and perceived financial constraints
We start our empirical analysis by investigating the relationship between self-reported measures
of financial constraints and competitive pressure. We estimate Ordered Probit regressions on the
categorical variable Access. Each regression includes a set of firm-level variables controlling for
age, size, volume of sales, legal status, export status and for country-year and industry-specific
fixed effects. Results suggest that, after controlling for a standard set of firm-level observable
factors and fixed-effects, there is a positive and significant correlation between a firm’s probability
of reporting serious financial constraints and a tough competitive environment.
The upper panel of Figure 1 plots the predicted probabilities associated to each level of Access
(y-axis) conditional on domestic competitive pressure (x-axis). More specifically, conditional
probabilities are obtained by plotting the marginal effects estimated by Ordered Probit on
Access.10 Ceteris paribus, the higher is the perceived level of competition, the higher is the
probability that a firm reports access to finance as a major obstacle; specifically we see that the
probability to report a Major obstacle increases from less than 20% to 30%, when moving from
the lowest to the highest competitive pressure. This shift is paralleled by a reduction from 40%
to less than 30% in the probability associated with the No obstacle response. A similar pattern
emerges from the graph in the lower panel where Access is conditioned on (CompFor). The
comparison of the two graphs reveals that firms’ access to credit declines faster in CompDom
than in CompFor.
10Table A4 in appendix show the regression output.
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of reporting different values of Access
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Notes. Conditional probabilities are estimated on the basis of the coefficients reported in column (1)
of Table A4 in the Appendix C. Probabilities are calculated for SME, private from the start-up, with
individual local ownership and that do not export directly. Each line refers to plots the probability
of reporting a particular severity of financial constraint conditional on a particular level of competitive
pressure. The financial constraint variable is Access that evaluate the extent to which access to credit is
an obstacle for firms’ growth and current operations.
This preliminary analysis supports the hypothesis that tougher competition is associated
with more serious financial constraints. Moreover, the data suggests that the pressure exerted by
domestic rather than foreign competitors is more strongly associated with a higher probability
of being credit constrained. A plausible explanation for this result is that firms that report
more intense foreign competitive pressure are those operating in a international context; these
are usually larger and have more internal resources (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2007). Although,
the cross-sectional nature of the analysis does not allow us to establish a direction of causality,
these results hint at a strong relation between competition and financial constraints.
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3.2 Demand or supply?
This section aims to disentangle the demand and supply factors that account for the positive and
significant correlation between self-reported measures of competition and financial constraints
that we reported in the previous section. More specifically, we test whether greater competitive
pressure increases the need for credit, or whether it worsen access to finance.
In order to identify financially constrained firms we first establish whether a firm needs
credit from a financial institution. Neither the 2005 or the 2009 questionnaires include a specific
question on a firm’s credit need. However, this information can be inferred from the answers to
a series of other questions. We consider in need for credit all those firms with a loan or that
applied for a loan. In the 2005 questionnaire we identify firms with a loan as those answering
positively to a question on whether they had to pledge collateral for their most recent loan
(question q46a), while in the 2009 questionnaire firms where directly asked whether they had a
loan (question k8).
We then identify firms which are credit rationed. The first group is composed by firms
that applied for a loan but they have been Rejected (question q47a in 2005 and k18a in 2009);
the second set includes firms needing a loan but they did not apply because Discouraged.
Discouraged firms are identified as those reporting one of the following reasons for not applying
for a loan: the interest rate is too high, they do not expect to obtain a loan, the size or the
maturity of the loan offered would be insufficient, they do not have sufficient collateral to pledge
(question k17). If loan applications are costly and if the probability of obtaining a loan at
favorable conditions is low, firms may decide not to apply for loans as a rational response to
observed restrictions in the supply of credit (Jappelli, 1990). Thus, discouraged borrowers should
be considered financially constrained.
Figure 2 splits the sample according to our classification. In the regression analysis this clas-
sification is operationalized by introducing a series of dummy variables assuming value one when
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Figure 2: Breakdown of the sample of firms by credit status
Need a loan 
  
Yes 
13325 
(70%) 
No 
5811 
(30%) 
Loan 
8467 
(64%) 
No-loan 
4858 
(36%) 
Discouraged 
2966 
(61.1%) 
Rejected 
845 
(17.3%) 
Other 
1047 
(21.5%) 
Notes. Each node of the figure reports the number of firms providing the answer to the survey question and the
percentage of respondents over the population of firms in the previous node. “Rejected” and “Discouraged” are
highlighted as these nodes includes all firms that we consider as “Rationed”.
a firm need credit (Need), when a firm has a loan (Loan), when a firm applied unsuccessfully
for a loan (Rejected), and when a firm was discouraged from applying for a loan by supply side
factors (Discouraged). As suggested in Figure 2, the dummy variables Loan, Discouraged and
Rejected can assume value one only among those firms that we classify as in need for a loan.
If competitive pressure affects credit demand, the selection into the estimation samples for the
regressions on Loan, Rejected and Discouraged is likely to be endogenous with respect to the
key independent variables. As a consequence, the non-randomness of the sample would bias the
estimates of the coefficients of interest.
Consistent estimates can be obtained by implementing Heckman probit models. These mod-
els are estimated by the maximum likelihood method and they address sample selection by
regressing simultaneously the ‘selection’ equation on the dichotomous variable Need, and the
probit equation on the outcome of interest (i.e., either Loan, Discouraged, or Rejected), while
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allowing for correlation in the errors of the two equations. This approach allows us to identify
the impact of competitive pressure on a firm’s probability to have a loan, or to be financially
constrained. This empirical strategy fits our main objective of disentangling the effect of com-
petitive pressure on the demand and on the supply of credit.
In order to identify the different coefficient of the competition variables in the two equations,
we need to select a set of variables that we exclude from the outcome equation and that we
include in the selection equation. These variables should be selected among the factors that are
related to a firm’s credit needs but not to the supply of credit. We identify four variables that
are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction: OverTax and OverUtil take value one if the firm
has overdue tax payments or overdue utility bills, respectively.11 It is reasonable to assume that
these two variables are positively related to negative idiosyncratic shocks to a firm cash-flow,
which increase a firm’s demand for short-term credit. When a firm has an overdue payment
it is more likely to require some sort of short-term financing to face the wage-bill or just to
continue normal operations. Nevertheless, a firm’s overdue payments are not expected to affect
the supply of credit, since these information are not easily acquired by financial institutions in
opaque systems.12.
Two additional variables excluded from the second-stage equation of the Heckman model
relate to a firm’s resort to trade credit or trade debit. The firms surveyed in the BEEPS are
asked what percentage of their total annual sales is paid for before the delivery and also the
percentage of total annual sales paid after delivery.13. Based on these information, TradeDebit
will take value zero if the firm did not sell any item on debt in the last fiscal year; in our sample
about 48% of the firms reporting that they were paid either on or after delivery. Similarly,
TradeCredit takes value one when the firm has provided some trade credit, here about 65% of
firms report to provide costumers with this form of finance. The literature has extensively shown
11See Appendix for the wording of survey questions and answers’ codes.
12A similar instrument is also used by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013).
13The wording of survey questions and the answers’ codes are reported in the Appendix.
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that trade credit/debit is an important source for financing, and they are particularly attractive
for financially constrained firms, even though trade credit is relative more expensive than short-
term bank financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).14 Thus, trade credit/debit is directly linked
with a firm’s shortage of liquidity and a firm’s demand for credit.
Results are presented in Table 3.15 Overall we find that the excluded variables are signif-
icantly correlated to the demand of credit; this provides support to our hypothesis that firms
which are in need for liquidity can be identified using overdue payments and the use of supplier
credit. We proxy firm’s size by sales, and we find that the coefficient on this variable is positive
in the second stage equation; this is consistent with the hypotheses that large establishments
have greater need for credit and are less likely to be either discouraged or rejected. The dummy
variable Audit takes value one if the firm has been audited by an external agency in the last
twelve months. As expected, a firm that is subject to external auditing has greater probability
to secure a loan and lower probability to be discouraged. The variable is not statistically sig-
nificant at the usual level of confidence in the regression on Rejected, but this is likely to be
caused by the low number of firms reporting this outcome.
The estimates reported in columns 2 to 4 provide clear support to the hypothesis that do-
mestic competition affects negatively the supply of credit, as we find a negative coefficient of
CompDom in the regression on Loan and a positive coefficient in the regression on Discouraged,
both of which are highly statistically significant. The results on rejection are statistically in-
significant, this is likely the result of the small number of firms in this sub-sample; specifically
only the 6% of firms declaring a need for loan are then declaring to be rejected by a credit
institution. On the contrary, foreign competition appears related to a firms greater need for
financing but not with a firms’ probability of having a loan, being discouraged or rejected. In-
14Estimates by (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) suggest that the cost of trade credit is equivalent to a 40 per cent
real interest rate.
15Table A5 in appendix, show the results when CompDom and CompFor are jointly included in the model.
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. We prefer the estimate in Table 3 given the degree of
correlation between the two forms of competitions.
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deed, the coefficient on CompFor is positive and significant in first-stage regressions on Need,
but is insignificant in second-stage regressions. A possible explanation is that firms engaged in
international trade are more exposed to foreign competition and report a higher level of this
variable. These firms may indeed have greater need for external financing to cover the greater
costs of foreign operations, while having a relatively sounder financial situation that improve
their access to credit. Alternatively, it is possible that competition in foreign markets is also
more difficult to observed and therefore is less likely to be part of investors’ information set.
4 The role of dissipative signals
Borrowers can reduce information asymmetry of information by signaling the firm’s prospects
to investors. The aim of this section is to test whether the negative relationship between com-
petition and access to credit still holds when borrowers provide signals of good performance and
sound financial structure. More specifically we test the effectiveness of three signaling devices:
certification, export status, and collateral.
4.1 The role of certification
Theory suggests the a good borrower has an incentive to mitigate the investors’ informational
disadvantage arising from informational asymmetries. One possible solution to overcome the
adverse selection is by increasing the information flow between the lender and the borrower. For
example, the borrower may signal its creditworthiness by seeking external auditing generating
hard information on a company’s finances. The use of hard information as a solution to the
asymmetric information problem, could be particularly relevant in transitional economies where
there may be a lack of transparency in company reporting and accounting standards, and lenders
may be more risk averse (Brown et al., 2011). Consistently, it has been shown at the cross-
country level that there is an inverse relationship between bank information sharing and access
15
to finance (Brown et al., 2009, 2011). On the lenders’ side, financial intermediaries can base their
lending decisions entirely on the firms’ creditworthiness rather than having to rely on sectoral
information.
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Table 3: Competition, credit demand and supply
Loan or line of credit Discouraged Rejected
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Dependent : Loan Need Loan Need Discouraged Need Discouraged Need Reject Need Reject Need
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom -0.151*** 0.293*** 0.164*** 0.298*** -0.108 0.301***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.060) (0.05) (0.090) (0.050)
CompFor -0.065 0.201*** 0.042 0.206*** 0.033 0.209***
(0.04) (0.040) (0.05) (0.04) (0.080) (0.040)
Controls
Audit 0.158*** (0.03) 0.152*** 0.012 -0.181*** 0.019 -0.178*** 0.012 0.066 0.018 0.066 0.011
(0.040) 0.020 (0.040) (0.0300) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030)
Sales 0.175*** 0.068*** 0.177*** 0.064*** -0.199*** 0.071*** -0.203*** 0.067*** -0.050*** 0.074*** -0.049*** 0.070***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Excluded
OverUtil 0.297*** 0.260*** 0.315*** 0.276*** 0.326*** 0.290***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
OverTax 0.272*** 0.291*** 0.308*** 0.326*** 0.363*** 0.380***
(0.060) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
TradeDebit 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.110***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
TradeCredit 0.315*** 0.324*** 0.297*** 0.308*** 0.269*** 0.290***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
ρ -0.750 -0.753 0.474 0.435 -0.461 -0.434
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.024 0.043
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466
Censored 3,610 3,476 3,610 3,476 3,610 3,476
Notes: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on firms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages).
Results are reported for three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the firms
need credit, but different 2nd stage dependent variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy=1 for firms that have a loan (columns 2-5), Disc, that is a
dummy=1 for firms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged (columns 6-9), Reject, that is a dummy=1 for firms that apply for a loan but are rejected
(columns 10-13). For each of these models we run a specification investigating the impact of domestic competition (CompDom), and a specification looking
at the impact of foreign competition (CompFor). For the interest of space we report only some of the firm-level controls included in both 1sth and 2nd stage
equations. Unreported controls include firms’ current and 3-year before size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE,
JV foreign, domestically owned private). The set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes:
OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for firms’ overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the
amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies
denovo, jointv, prisoe and subsoe that denote a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment. ρ is the coefficient of correlation between the first- and
the second-stage errors. S.e. are cluster at country-year level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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To test this hypothesis we introduce in the specification of the Heckman Probit models an
interaction between the variable of competition and the dummy Audit, that takes value one if
the firm had its annual financial statements checked and certified by an external auditor during
the previous fiscal year. Estimation results are reported in Table 4. The interacted coefficient
in second-stage regressions is always negative and significant. This suggests that for audited
firms’ access to credit the level of domestic and foreign competition is irrelevant. This evidence
is consistent with the idea that lenders do not have to rely on soft information, such as the level
of competition, when hard information, such as auditing, is available. The estimated coefficients
of the controls and the exclusion restrictions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
estimated in Table 5.
4.2 International firms and financial constraints
In this section we exploit a firm’s export status to test whether the negative correlation between
competitive pressure and access to credit is related to lenders’ concerns about the sustainability
of the borrower’s debt in a tough domestic environment. A recent trade literature focusing on
firms’ heterogeneity has stressed how export status provides a strong signal about companies’
current and future ability to survive on the domestic market, since only more capable firms
select into exporting (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Hence, our hypothesis is
that a firm’s export status mitigates the detrimental effect of competitive pressure on access to
credit only if this relation is explained by the higher probability of default for firms operating
in competitive industries. We utilize export status as a signal of a firm’s creditworthiness to
better characterize the nexus between competition and financial constraints.
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Table 4: Competition, credit demand and supply. Revealing information through
auditing
Loan or line of credit Discouraged
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Loan Need Loan Need Discouraged Need Discouraged Need
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom -0.251*** 0.296*** 0.239*** 0.298***
(0.070) (0.050) (0.070) (0.050)
CompDom × Audit 0.243*** -0.205*
(0.090) (0.110)
CompFor -0.138** 0.203*** 0.100 0.206***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.060) (0.040)
CompFor × Audit 0.165* -0.129
(0.09) (0.090)
Controls
Sales 0.173*** 0.068*** 0.174*** 0.064*** -0.198*** 0.071*** -0.198*** 0.067***
(0.030) (0.010) (0.02) (0.01) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Audit 0.004 0.022 0.091* 0.009 -0.051 0.014 -0.135* 0.007
(0.070) (0.030) (0.05) (0.03) (0.080) (0.030) (0.060) (0.030)
Excluded
OverUtil 0.297*** 0.259*** 0.313*** 0.275***
(0.090) (0.09) (0.100) (0.10)
OverTax 0.269*** 0.288*** 0.307*** 0.325***
(0.060) (0.07) (0.060) (0.070)
TradeDebit 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.020) (0.02) (0.020) (0.030)
TradeCredit 0.315*** 0.324*** 0.298*** 0.308***
(0.030) (0.03) (0.030) (0.030)
ρ -0.765 -0.757 0.490 0.449
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.015
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466
Censored 3,610 3,476 3,610 3,476
Notes: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on firms demand for credit
(1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results are reported for three different models with the same 1st stage
dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the firms need credit, but different
2nd stage dependent variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy=1 for firms that have a loan (columns 1-4),
Disc, that is a dummy=1 for firms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged (columns 5-8), Reject, that is a
dummy=1 for firms that apply for a loan but are rejected (columns 9-12). Audit takes the value of 1 if if the firm has
been audited during the last year. For the interest of space we report only some of the firm-level controls included
in both 1sth and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include firms’ current and 3-year before size (dummies
for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign, domestically owned private). The
set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes:
OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for firms’ overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and
TradeCredit that are respectively the amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to
consumers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe and subsoe
that denote a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment. ρ is the coefficient of correlation between the
first- and the second-stage errors. S.e. are cluster at country-year level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01.
The starting point for this analysis is the Heckman selection model introduced in Section
??. Two modifications are now introduced on the right-hand side of the model to account for
firm’s export position. First, we introduce a dummy to capture a firm’s export status (exp3 ),
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this assumes the value of 1 for those firms that exported part of their output directly three
years before the survey date, and value 0 otherwise.16 The major advantage of using a lagged
variable for export is that it is less likely to be simultaneously determined by the probability to
be discouraged (or rejected) in regressions. Indeed, our dependent variables, Loan, Discouraged
and Rejected refer to credit events occurred in the fiscal year before the survey date, while exp3
refers to the export status of the firm three years before the survey date. Second, the variables
capturing domestic and foreign competitive pressure (CompDom and CompFor, respectively)
are included in the model interacted with exp3 and with NOexp3 = 1 − exp3. Hence, the
coefficients of the terms CompDom×exp3 and CompFor×exp3 capture the correlation between
competition and credit rationing for those firms that exported three years before the survey date.
On the contrary, the coefficients on CompDom×NOexp3 and CompFor×NOexp3 capture the
same correlation for non-exporters. By allowing the coefficients of CompDom and CompFor to
differ between exporters and non-exporters, this design provides a test of whether export status
improves credit access by providing a signal to financial intermediaries about firms’ greater
capacity to withstand competitive pressure.
The results from the two-step Heckman model are reported in Table 5. Second-stage regres-
sions on Loan, Discouraged and Rejected provide strong evidence that the positive relationship
between competition, both domestic and foreign, and financial constraints holds for non-exporter
but it does not hold for exporters. Therefore, export status appears arising as an effective strat-
egy for firms that operative in competitive environments to improve their access to financing.
16Out of 19123 respondents, about 22% of firms report a value different from zero.
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Table 5: Exporters Vs non non-exporters
Loan or line of credit Discouraged Rejected
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom× exp3 -0.038 0.259*** -0.016 0.260*** -0.249** 0.226***
(0.100) (0.090) (0.120) (0.090) (0.120) (0.090)
CompDom × NOexp3 -0.171*** 0.319*** 0.195*** 0.325*** -0.061 0.350***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.110) (0.050)
CompFor × exp3 0.042 0.115 -0.056 0.111 -0.007 0.118
(0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.080) (0.13) (0.080)
CompFor × NOexp3 -0.118*** 0.200*** 0.092 0.205** 0.022 0.239***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.050) (0.07) (0.050)
exp3 0.032 0.211*** 0.053 0.170*** 0.028 0.215*** -0.056 0.176*** 0.149 0.273*** 0.070 0.197***
(0.090) (0.070) (0.080) (0.060) (0.110) (0.070) (0.090) (0.060) (0.100) (0.070) (0.080) (0.060)
Controls
Sales 0.170*** 0.063*** 0.172*** 0.060*** -0.195*** 0.065*** -0.195*** 0.063*** -0.052*** 0.069*** -0.053*** 0.067
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Audit 0.154*** 0.015 0.149*** 0.010 -0.179*** 0.015 -0.181*** 0.009 0.068 0.010 0.068 0.003
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030)
Excluded
Overutil 0.301*** 0.262*** 0.318*** 0.278*** 0.336*** 0.300***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Overtax 0.269*** 0.287*** 0.307*** 0.325*** 0.376*** 0.392***
(0.060) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Tradedebit 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.095***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Tradecredit 0.310*** 0.322*** 0.293 0.306*** 0.282*** 0.297***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466 12,909 12,532
Censored 3,610 3,476 3,610 3,476 3,628 3,494
ρ -0.760 -0.751 0.485 0.447 -0.407 -0.339
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.059 0.069
Notes: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on firms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages).
Results are reported for three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the firms
need credit, but different 2nd stage dependent variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy=1 for firms that have a loan (columns 2-5), Disc, that is a
dummy=1 for firms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged (columns 6-9), Reject, that is a dummy=1 for firms that apply for a loan but are rejected
(columns 10-113). exp3 assumes the value of 1 for those firms that exported part of their output. NOexp3 is equal to 1 − exp3. directly three years before
the survey date For the interest of space we report only some of the firm-level controls included in both 1sth and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls
include firms’ current and 3-year before size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign, domestically owned
private). The set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that
are dummies for firms’ overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the amount of credit received by the
company from suppliers and extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe and subsoe
that denote a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment. ρ is the coefficient of correlation between the first- and the second-stage errors. S.e. are
cluster at country-year level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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4.3 The collateral channel
Extensive work has been conducted on the role of collateral as a key determinant of firms’
borrowing capacity. For instance, Chan and Thakor (1987) show how borrowers who pledge
collateral are less subject to moral hazard; by sharing part of the risk, borrowers are prevented
from increasing their expected return against lenders’ interests. In addition, when lenders cannot
identify ex-ante the risk embodied in borrowers’ projects, collateral can be used as a device
through which safer borrowers signal their nature to financial intermediaries (Manove et al.,
2001). Starting from these premises, this section investigates whether there exists a collateral
channel through which competitive pressure translates into more difficult access to credit. In
other words, we test wether firms in more competitive industries are required to pledge more
collateral to access affordable credit. Indeed, a collateral channel may explain the positive
relationship between competitive pressure and discouragement from loan application.
We first report the reasons for discouragement from loan application, as reported by firms’
representatives when answering question k17.17 Table 6 shows the number of firms reporting
each of the possible reasons to be discouraged as a proportion of the respondents. The three main
causes of discouragement are high interest rates (34.1%), complexity of application procedures
(29%), and high collateral requirements (19.1%). While there is not any theoretical foundation
to expect that domestic competitive pressure induces banks to adopt more complex procedures
for loan applications, the link between competitive pressure, high interest rates and collateral
requirement can be rationalized with the argument that firms in highly competitive industries
are riskier borrowers because they face greater probability of failure and greater uncertainty over
future return. The positive relation between cost of credit and competition is supported by the
results previously reported in Section 3.1, whereas the relation between collateral requirement
and competitive pressure remains to be tested.
17Answers to this question has been across the two survey waves.
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Table 6: Reasons for being Discouraged
Freq. Percent
Application procedures are to complex 1,086 29.11
Interest rates are not favorable 1,275 34.17
Collateral requirements are too high 714 19.14
Size of loan or maturity are insufficient 113 3.03
It is necessary to make informal payment 54 1.45
Did not think it would be approved 162 4.34
Other 325 8.71
No response 2 0.05
Total 3,731 100
Notes: Table refers to question k17 in the BEEPS panel
dataset.
The variable Collateral (i.e., collateral requirement as a proportion of the loan value, ques-
tion k15) is regressed on CompDom and CompFor and on the set of firm-level controls pre-
viously used in the augmented model on Access.18 However, since the values of Collateral are
observed only for those firms that obtain credit, it is still necessary to correct for selection bias.
As for before the first stage of the regression takes into consideration whether a firm needs ex-
ternal financing. The first-stage regression on Need maintains the same specification previously
used in section ??.
First, the model is estimated on the whole sample; Table 7 reports the first set of results.
When the model is estimated on the whole sample, firms exposed to the most intense level of
domestic competition, CompDom, are found pledging collateral that covers on average 11.4%
more of the loan value than firms exposed to the lowest level of domestic competition. In line
with the previous evidence we find that the a firm’s size and the auditing enter positively in the
first stage of the regression.
We then explore the role of the collateral by taking advantage both of the cross-firm and the
cross-country dimensions our dataset. 19 Table 8 reports estimated obtained by running the
regressions on different samples. Because strong legal right enforcement is a prerequisite for a
18As reported in column 1 of Table A4. See Appendix for working of BEEPS question on collateral.
19The analysis in this section ignores the role of foreign competition, given that it was found to be statistically
insignificance in the previous sections.
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creditor’s ability to size the collateral in case of a firm’s default, we first run separate regressions
for firms operating in countries with relatively stronger or weaker legal rights enforcement.
Legal right enforcement is measured using the Strength of legal rights index (0-10) from the
World Bank Doing Business Database. We classify countries with a value of the index above
the sample median of 6 as those having a relatively higher score. We then estimate separate
regressions for firms operating in countries adhering to the European Union. Lastly, we estimate
separate models on the samples of smaller and larger firms. We find that domestic competition is
associated with higher collateral requirements in countries with stronger legal right enforcement
(Legalrightsindex > 6). This result is consistent with the argument made in the literature
according to which the use of collateral is common only in those countries where creditors’
rights are sufficiently protected to ensure that collateralized assets can be eventually seized by
lenders (EBRD, 2006). Similar results are instead obtained for countries within or outside the
EU. On the contrary, firm size is found mediating the relationship between competition and
collateral requirements, as we find that competitive pressure is associated with greater collateral
requirements only among small companies.
The positive correlation between CompDom and Collateral supports the hypothesis that
financial constraints are more severe when competition is intense. On one hand, financial insti-
tutions may require more collateral to accept loan applications from firms that operate in more
competitive industries. On the other hand, even if investors do not impose minimum levels, en-
trepreneurs may still need to pledge relatively more collateral to obtain affordable credit. This
process configures a vicious cycle for small firms; they are more dependent on debt financing
for growth but at they same time they are also more vulnerable to competitive pressure than
larger incumbents.20 As a consequence, when banks sign debt contracts with small firms whose
survival is threatened by competitors, they require higher interest rates or more collateral to
20This evidence sits well with the model of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) where financial frictions higher mortality
of young and small firms.
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insure themselves against borrowers’ greater risk of default.
Table 7: Collateral channel
Domestic Foreign
Collateral Need Collateral Need
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom 11.431*** 0.129***
(3.620) (0.040)
CompFor 4.302 0.105***
(3.300) (0.040)
Controls
Sales -1.279 0.183*** -1.415 0.282***
-(1.420) (0.010) (1.440) -0.02
Audit -1.899 0.136*** -2.059 0.120***
(2.55) (0.030) (2.58) -0.03
Excluded
Overutil 0.216*** 0.194***
(-0.070) -0.070
Overtax 0.135*** 0.147**
(-0.070) -0.070
Tradedebit 0.137*** 0.131***
(0.030) (0.030)
Tradecredit 0.329*** 0.331***
(0.030) (0.030)
λ -14.012 -14.348
s.e. 9.202 9.508
Obs. 12,267 11,910
Censored 6,698 6,452
Notes: The table reports estimates from two-step Heckman
Probit models on firms demand for credit (1st stages) and
credit supply (2nd stages). Results are reported for two dif-
ferent models with the same 1st stage dependent variable ex-
pressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the
firms need credit, and the second the variable Collateral takes
the value of 1 if the firm has a loan it some collateral was
provided. . For each of these models we run a specification in-
vestigating the impact of domestic competition (CompDom),
and a specification looking at the impact of foreign competition
(CompFor). Audit takes the value of 1 if the firm’s financial
statements were checked and certified by external auditor dur-
ing the last last fiscal. For the interest of space we report
only some of the firm-level controls included in both 1sth and
2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include firms’ cur-
rent and 3-year before size (dummies for medium and large
companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign,
domestically owned private). The set of regressors under the
heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand
equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that are
dummies for firms’ overdue payments for utility bills and tax-
ation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the
amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and
extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments in-
clude also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe and
subsoe that denote a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its es-
tablishment. λ is the coefficient of correlation between the first-
and the second-stage errors. S.e. are cluster at country-year
level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 8: Collateral channel heterogeneity
Legal >6 Legal <6 EU=0 EU=1 Size=1 Size=3
Collateral Need Collateral Need Collateral Need Collateral Need Collateral Need Collateral Need
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom 17.153*** 0.096* 3.662 0.228*** 9.967** 0.167*** 13.416** 0.061 11.978* 0.001 8.423 0.187**
(4.790) 0.050) (6.420) (0.070) (4.930) (0.050) (5.320) (0.070) (6.400) (0.060) (6.18) (0.087)
Controls
Sales -2.000 0.162*** 0.280 0.224*** -0.671 0.188*** -3.148 0.178*** 4.993* 0.189 -2.073 0.154
(1.800) (0.01) (2.59) (0.02) (1.890) (0.010) (2.110) (0.02) (2.840) (0.020) (2.08) (0.02)
Audit 2.237 0.123*** -8.059* 0.085* 0.188*** 0.113*** -0.040 0.164*** -2.673 0.141*** -4.273 0.270***
(3.420) (0.04) (4.28) (0.050) (0.01) (0.040) (3.940) (0.050) (4.740) (0.040) (5.44) (0.070)
Excluded
Overutil 0.132 0.417*** 0.103 0.359*** 0.209* 0.107
(0.090) (0.130) (0.090) (0.110) (0.110) (0.140)
Overtax 0.102 0.212* 0.241*** -0.003 0.013 0.166
(0.080) (0.120) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.130)
Tradedebit 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.111*** 0.187*** 0.063 0.210***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060)
Tradecredit 0.350*** 0.258*** 0.336*** 0.315*** 0.369*** 0.272***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.070)
λ -19.470 -8.872 -12.299 -28.416 12.372 -23.487
s.e. 12.478 14.304 11.734 13.849 15.956 19.356
Obs. 6,674 4,136 7,200 5,067 5,718 2,682
Censored 3,671 2,158 4,126 2,572 3,791 994
Notes: The table reports estimates from two-step Heckman Probit models on firms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results
are reported for two different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the firms need
credit, and the second the variable Collateral takes the value of 1 if the firm has a loan it some collateral was provided. . For each of these models we run a
specification investigating the impact of domestic competition (CompDom), and a specification looking at the impact of foreign competition (CompFor).
Audit takes the value of 1 if the firm’s financial statements were checked and certified by external auditor during the last last fiscal. For the interest of
space we report only some of the firm-level controls included in both 1sth and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include firms’ current and 3-year
before size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign, domestically owned private). The set of regressors
under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for firms’
overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the amount of credit received by the company from
suppliers and extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe and subsoe that denote
a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment. Legal is the strength of legal rights index (0-10) from the World Bank Doing Business Database.
EU takes the value of 1 for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland , Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. λ is the coefficient of
correlation between the first- and the second-stage errors. S.e. are cluster at country-year level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the hypothesis that in relatively underdeveloped financial systems the
competitive environment plays an important role in lenders’ information set when deciding upon
firms’ cost and access to financing. More specifically, we investigate whether both greater need
for financing and tighter access to finance concur to worsen the financial constraints experienced
by firms operating in tough markets.
Evidence from transition economies, where financial frictions are exacerbated by relatively
underdeveloped legal systems, suggest that financial constraints are more serious in the presence
of fiercer competitive pressure. By disentangling the impact of competition on the demand
and supply of credit we support the hypothesis that competitive pressure on borrowers affects
both sides of the credit market; demand for credit is higher in competitive industries but a
greater proportion of firms are discouraged from loan application because of high collateral
requirements and high cost of credit. This result can be explained by the fact that firms under
greater competitive pressure are perceived as riskier borrowers. Indeed, the relation between
competition and financial constraints is relaxed for firms that have their financial statements
audited and for exporters whose international activity is a strong signal of their survival prospects
on the domestic market (Bridges and Guariglia, 2008).
From a policy perspective our results suggest that policy measures aimed at relaxing firms’
financial constraints should be particularly targeted to those industries with greater competitive
pressure, and that export promotion policies may have desirable indirect effects on firms’ access
to financing.Lastly, from the point of view of transition economies, liberalization policies that
deepen domestic and foreign competition should be accompanied or preceded by interventions
to reduce the cost of credit and to increase credit supply for small and medium enterprises.
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Appendix
Table A1: Values assumed by the categorical variables
Variable Wording of survey questions and answers’ codes
Financial Constraints
Access QUESTION: Can you tell me how problematic is access to financing (e.g., collateral required) or
financing not available from banks for the operations and growth of your business?
ANSWERS: 1-No obstacle, 2-Minor obstacle, 3-Moderate obstacle, 4-Major obstacle.
ANSWERS: 1-No obstacle, 2-Minor obstacle, 3-Moderate obstacle, 4-Major obstacle.
Competition
CostDom QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from domestic competitors on key
decisions with respect to reducing the production costs of existing products or services?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
CostFor QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from foreign competitors on key
decisions with respect to reducing the production costs of existing products or services?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
ProdDom QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from domestic competitors on key
decisions with respect to developing new products services and markets?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
ProdFor QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from foreign competitors on key
decisions with respect to developing new products services and markets?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
Exclusion restrictions
Overutil Does this establishment currently have any payments overdue by more than 90 days with each of the
following:
ANSWERS: 1-Yes, 2-No.
Overtax Does this establishment currently have any payments overdue by more than 90 days with each of the
following:
ANSWERS: 1-Yes, 2-No.
TradeDebit In fiscal year [...], what percent of this establishment’s total annual sales of its goods or services were:
ANSWERS: Paid for before the delivery?
TradeCredit In fiscal year [...], what percent of this establishment’s total annual sales of its goods or services were:
ANSWERS: Paid for after the delivery?
Collateral
Collateral Referring only to this most recent line of credit or loan, what was the approximate value of the collateral
required as a percentage of the value of the loan or line of credit?
ANSWER: Value of collateral as percent of loan/line of credit value.
Exporters
exp What percentage of establishment’s sales were:
ANSWER: direct exports
Table A2: Questions for Need, Loan, Discouraged and Rejected
BEEPS 2005
q46a “Thinking of the most recent loan you obtained from a financial institution, did the financing require collateral?"
q47a “If your firm does not currently have a loan, what was the reason?"
q47b “If your firm did not apply for a loan, what were the main reasons?"
BEEPS 2009
k8 “Does this establishment have a line of credit or a loan from a financial institutions?"
k17 “Which is the main reason for not applying for a loan or a line of credit?"
k18a “In fiscal year 2007, did this establishment apply for any new loans or new lines of credit that were rejected?"
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Table A3: Breakdown of the sample by firm-type
Access CostDom CostFor
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Legal origin
Former SOE 32.75 18.45 22.96 25.83 18.93 19.37 32.07 29.63 45.40 18.34 18.76 17.51
Private 32.24 18.81 24.88 24.08 15.51 19.39 33.34 31.76 45.55 19.97 18.85 15.63
Subs. SOE 31.69 19.48 27.01 21.82 16.02 19.64 32.56 31.78 44.95 17.55 18.88 18.62
JV foreign 40.41 19.41 22.12 18.06 23.23 22.12 29.87 24.78 28.00 21.33 26.44 24.22
Size
Small 32.62 18.46 24.47 24.46 16.67 19.75 32.24 31.34 51.73 18.51 16.32 13.44
Medium 32.14 19.44 24.46 23.96 16.14 19.12 33.46 31.28 44.59 19.76 18.84 16.81
Large 35.49 18.16 23.77 22.58 19.86 18.80 31.88 29.46 35.14 20.31 23.80 20.75
Age
Young 31.39 20.29 24.65 23.66 19.69 19.49 32.24 28.58 52.17 20.00 16.59 11.24
Mid-Age 33.21 18.79 24.3 23.70 16.38 19.68 33.06 30.88 45.76 19.55 19.00 15.69
Mature 31.78 17.88 23.98 26.36 19.00 18.14 31.17 31.70 40.65 18.97 19.58 20.80
Total (%) 32.83 18.77 24.28 24.13 17.07 19.42 32.69 30.82 45.45 19.50 18.90 16.15
Notes: Notes. The table reports the percentage of firms reporting different levels of Access, CostDom and
CostFor, by legal orgin, size and age.
Table A4: Competitive intensity
and reported level of Access
(1) (2) (3)
Access Access Access
CompDom 0.562*** 0.483***
CompFor 0.397*** 0.275***
Notes: The table reports estimates from Ordered
Probit regressions on Access. Firm-level controls
for age, productivity, volume of sales, legal sta-
tus, export status are included in all specifica-
tions but not reported. All regressions control for
country-year and industry-specific fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01.
Table A5: Competition, credit demand and supply
Need a loan Discouraged Rejected
Loan Need Loan Need Loan Need
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom -0.140** 0.272*** 0.161 0.274*** -0.131*** 0.277***
(0.060) (0.050) (0.07) (0.050) (0.100) (0.050)
CompFor -0.034 0.128*** 0.011 0.131*** 0.099 0.134***
(0.05) (0.040) (0.060) (0.040) (0.07) (0.040)
Controls
Sales 0.175*** 0.065*** -0.197*** 0.067*** -0.050*** 0.075***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.02) (0.010)
Audit 0.154*** 0.011 -0.183*** 0.012 0.064 0.024
(0.040) (0.030) (0.050) (0.03) (0.05) (0.030)
Excluded
Overutil 0.265*** 0.280*** 0.291***
(0.090) (0.100) (0.100)
Overtax 0.289*** 0.324** 0.377***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Tradedebit 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.109***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
Tradecredit 0.314*** 0.297*** 0.270***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040)
ρ -0.749 0.464 -0.439
s.e. 0.000 0.009 0.042
Obs. 12,421 12,421 12,571
Censored 3,460 3,460 3,610
Notes: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit mod-
els on firms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results
are reported for three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable
expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy=1 if the firms need credit, but
different 2nd stage dependent variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy=1
for firms that have a loan (columns 1-4), Disc, that is a dummy=1 for firms that do not
apply for a loan because discouraged (columns 5-8), Reject, that is a dummy=1 for
firms that apply for a loan but are rejected (columns 9-12). For each of these models
we run a specification investigating the impact of domestic competition (CompDom),
and a specification looking at the impact of foreign competition (CompFor). For the
interest of space we report only some of the firm-level controls included in both 1sth
and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include firms’ current and 3-year be-
fore size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for
SOE, JV foreign, domestically owned private). The set of regressors under the head-
ing ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes:
OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for firms’ overdue payments for utility
bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the amount of
credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to consumers. The set
of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe
and subsoe that denote a firm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment. ρ is
the coefficient of correlation between the first- and the second-stage errors. S.e. are
cluster at country-year level. Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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